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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-2a-3(2), and the provisions of Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Where defendant Lloyd Hone ["Lloyd"] failed to produce evidence that 
plaintiff Alton Hone ["Alton"], acting as Trustee for the Rulon J. Hone Family Inter 
Vivos Revocable Trust [the "Trust"] had violated any law or regulation, did the trial court 
err in finding that Alton had unclean hands? The standard of review is the clearly 
erroneous standard. Utah DOT v. G. Kay, Inc.. 78 P.3d 612, 483 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 
2003 UT 40 2003, [^5 (Utah 2003). See Argument section 1(1) below. 
2. Where the trial court held that Alton knew his conduct violated a law or 
regulation based solely on presumed knowledge of the law, did the court err in applying 
the clean hands doctrine to Alton? The standard of review is correctness. Reliance Ins. 
Co. v. Utah Dept. of Transp.. 858 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1993). See Argument section I 
(2) below. 
3. Where the trial court found that Lloyd was guilty of fraudulent misconduct 
in inducing the transfer of Trust property to himself, did the trial court abuse its discretion 
when it applied the clean hands doctrine to Alton? The standard of review is abuse of 
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discretion. Willey v. Willev, 914 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah App 1996) citing Watson v. 
Watson, 561 P.2d 1072, 1073-74 (Utah 1977). See Argument section II below. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no statutes or provisions which are wholly dispositive of the issues 
presented in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final order of the Fourth Judicial District Court. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The trial court held a bench trial on August 5, 1999. (R. 242). In its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law dated September 12, 2001, the court found in favor of 
Lloyd. (R. 155). On September 20, 2001, Alton filed amotion for a new trial. (R. 159). 
Although the trial court modified its reasoning based on Alton's motion, on April 8, 2003, 
the trial court denied the motion. (R.201). 
Alton filed his Notice of Appeal on May 5, 2003. (R.226). 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Rulon and Alta Hone, husband and wife, established the Trust on July 24, 1974. 
(Exhibit 1). Initially, both Rulon and Alta were the Trustees of the Trust. (Exhibit lat 7, 
f^ 1). Upon the death of one of the original trustees, the Trust appointed the surviving 
spouse, and their sons, Merrill Hone, Alton, and Lloyd, Trustees of the Trust. Id. 
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\ ftei I <! i il< )i: 11 h : »i ie"s death. Alia Hone became ill and needed institutional health 
care. (R. 154, FOF1 % 7). In deciding hov, i- provide such care v Mta. the children -r 
\ l ta and r Jo* I h u e determined Medicaid could provide assistance. ' D ' M 1 )l c o l 
They understood it lat it \ lta accepted i i u *dicaid bei lei its ' lta ai v :l 1 ler estati t • r : i lid 
vlcdicaid lien or a statutory right of reimbursement. (R. 154, 
FOF1J8). 
Lloyd alone met with representative^ ol Medicaid to discuss this matter. (R I 53, 
1 l ) | ""j "J" I-! '"I '" l i a i in i ip l MJ'.'l I loul icpoih/J In \\u MIIICI HI. inhere I (In luniih lh.it 
the Trustees could transfer the assets of the I rust, consisting primarily of the family 
homestead (the "Homestead"), to 1loyd withoiit making Alta ineligible for medicaid 
benefits and ^,.1.0.11 incurring any Medicaid liens or penalties. ("I , 83: R 153 1 01 " "l! | 9; 
1. /-, becai ise 1 le as a ::1 lill ::l : i ' \ lta 1 lad liv c :1 ii: i the I ion le w itl 11 lei foi 
the required amount oi ume and because he himself was disabled, the Trust could transfer 
the Homestead to him, Alta could receive Medicaid benefits, and there would be no liens 
or other encuiiihi.ini es on lln 1  loinrsluid when \K.ii i e t n \ e d Medicaid in/neti! , | I ."?h; 
T. 29; 1. 74). Further, Lloyd stated that if the Trustees transferred the Homestead to him, 
upon Alta 's death, Lloyd would transfer the Homestead back to the Trust (R. 153, FOF j^ 
1
 The trial court >^ nnuings of fact and conclusions oi law are located at R. 
149 tliron dh ! ^ \, When citing to this part of the record, Alton also uses the acronym 
"FOF" . 
2
 The entire transcript is contained at record page 242. All future references 
to the transcript will be designated as 4 T, [page number of t ranscr ip t ] . " 
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12). Lloyd repeatedly stated that his proposed plan [the "Plarr ] was in harmony with and 
did not violate Medicaid laws and regulations. (T. 83; R. 153, FOF ^ 9; T. 74). 
Alta's family, including Lloyd and Alton, had multiple discussions about the Plan, 
specifically including Lloyd's promise to reconvey the Homestead to the Trust after Alta 
died. On multiple occasions, both before and after the Trustees transferred the 
Homestead to Lloyd, Lloyd promised to reconvey the Homestead to the Trust. (See 
generally R. 243, Deposition of Alton Hone at 153; T. 74-75; T. 67-69). 
In reliance on Lloyd's representations that the Plan did not violate any Medicaid 
laws or regulations, and his express promise to return the Homestead to the Trust after 
Alta's death, Alta and other member of the family agreed that the Trustees of the Trust 
would transfer the Homestead to Lloyd. (R. 152, FOF ^ 14; R. 151, FOF ^ 21; T. 24; T. 
30; T. 75). Thus, on February 28, 1994, Lloyd and the other two Trustees, Alton and 
Alta,4 transferred the Homestead to Lloyd. (Exhibit 3; T. 30; T. 81). 
After receiving Medicaid benefits for approximately one year, Alta Hone died on 
Christmas day, 1995. (T. 23). Thereafter, Alton requested Lloyd reconvey the 
Homestead to the Trust. (R. 152, FOF ^ 16; T. 23). Lloyd refused. (R. 152, FOF [^16; D. 
16-17). On October 2, 1996, Lloyd resigned as Trustee of the Trust. (Exhibit 5; T. 23). 
3
 The Deposition Transcript of Alton Hone is contained at record page 243, 
was published at T.54, and is referred to hereafter as "D. [page number of transcript] ." 
4
 The fourth trustee, Merrill Hone, had died in 1987. 
Page 4 
A ^ 1 rustee of the I rust, then sued Lloyd for recover}- of the I lomestead. (R. 
17-28). At one point. Lloyd offered to pay tl IC Trust $150,000. (T. 96).5 
In its findings of fact, the trial coi irt \^n .* n. i ui irauduicm- Misrepresented 
I\ ledicaid i i lies ai id i c:: gi ilatioi is ai id tl ic: ii in i lpact : i I II: l i s I \z i i (R 153 F X3I " % 12). 1 1 me 
coui t fur ther found that Alton6 reasonably relied on Lloyd's representation of Medicaid 
laws and regulations. (F > 52, FOF ^ ' ' • ¥ addition, the court found that Alton also 
reasonably relied upon L l o y d s representations itmt 
I Ill Il i I . 1111 \\\ i ih ill ill I 11 M H 1 'I I u that when the 
Trustees of the I rust transferred the Homestead to Lloyd, they were relying upon Lloyd's 
fraudulent misrepresentations 'T? ] 52. FOF m 14). Finally, the court held that Lloyd 
damaged tl le I i i ist tl: n on igl I 1: lis d vv as i n lji istb ' e t it icl ic d. ai id til: lat tl: le Coi n t 
""^  •- * * son: ic \ :t:i: i just enrichment by one individual." (R. 151, FOF ^ 22 
and 23; T. 122). 
In its conclusions of law, the trial court:. 1 leld that \lton 1: lad satisfied his burden for 
estal 
concluded Alton had also proven Lloyd committed fraud and that Lloyd's fraud damaged 
the Trust and its beneficiaries. (R. 150, FOF % 4). Further, the court held that Lloyd 
5
 No objection was made to this testimony and thus URE Rule 408 does not 
apply to this testimony. 
6
 There were multiple family members involved. For coin :. 
tiiL :»: ncinal family members are referred to hereafter as "Alton " 
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breached his fiduciary duty as a Trustee by conveying the Homestead to himself, and then 
refusing to transfer it back to the Trust. (R. 150, FOF j^ 5). The court thus held that 
reformation of the deed to place ownership back in the Trust would be an appropriate 
remedy. (R. 150,^4). 
Notwithstanding this analysis, the trial court nevertheless refused to grant Alton 
relief. The court implicitly found that the Plan violated Medicaid laws or regulations. 
While Alton reasonably relied on Lloyd's fraudulent misrepresentations, the court 
charged Alton with knowledge of the law contrary to his reasonable reliance and found he 
came to court with unclean hands. (R. 150, FOF U 3). The court ruled: "I am barred, this 
Court is barred, from providing relief, including reformation of the deed." (R. 150, FOF f^ 
6; T. 122). 
As noted above, Alton moved for a new trial. In response to that motion, the trial 
court acknowledged that it was not barred from providing the relief, but that it could 
weigh the relative misconduct of the parties in determining whether to provide Alton 
equitable relief. (R. 200, ^jl). However, the court concluded that Alton was not entitled 
to equitable relief, and it therefore denied Alton's motion for a new trial. (R. 220). 
This appeal ensued. (R. 226). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ln order to successfully defend a claim based on ?U CLM:.- hands doctrine th ~ 
defendant must introduce record evidence si toXMiiii ma. ic j van ..in .*. : 
improper. Absent a Imindalinnal \h - :- i buine law 
i •s an be no finding of unclean hands. Here Lloyd failed to introduce 
any record evidence that would support a finding that Alton's conduct was improper. 
Thus, there was no factual basis loi ivl using relief based i \ 
Even > «n, in uider u> dp-" 
unclean hands a^  a bai lo leli^i, i^ iuvU v\a^ required lo snow thai Alton's misconduct was 
knowing and wilful. Where the cotirt found Alton did not know that his conduct was 
improper,7 and imputed improper conduct h\ clurymy him ^ ill > kmm U due ni i|n l:nv, 
tl- - ' • cirine. 
Finally, in balancing the equities, the trial court should have weighed Alton's 
misconduct based on imputed knowledge of misconduct versus I doyd's misconduct 
constituting fraud ami utttii JHU u in mid \u\\ i nrdetvil iviirf inula ihr l*url> ml 1I11-, t hi 
In lacl. the trial court affirmatively found that Alton reasonably idled 
Lloyd's fraudulent misrepresentations (R 152. FOF 1H4; R. 151, FOF1f21). 
1 1 1 i 1 1 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD BOTH IN ITS FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND IN ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT ALTON HAD 
UNCLEAN HANDS. 
1. THERE WAS NO FACTUAL NOR LEGAL BASIS FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDING OF FACT AND LEGAL CONCLUSION THA T 
ALTON HAD UNCLEAN HANDS. 
Before the clean hands doctrine will preclude an equitable remedy, there must be a 
factual basis to support the holding that a party had unclean hands.8 Alton will marshal 
the evidence and demonstrate that Lloyd failed to present foundational evidence that 
supports the trial court's finding that Alton had unclean hands. State v. Nichols, 76 P.3d 
1173, 480 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2003 UT App 287, ^ 25, fn.3 (Utah App. 2003). 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
There was one factual finding and two legal conclusions that could support the 
Court's ultimate conclusion that "plaintiff comes with unclean hands, [and thus] the Court 
is barred from providing equitable relief. . . prayed for." (R. 150, FOF Tf6). The only 
finding of fact9 stated: 
Whether denominated a finding of fact or a conclusion of law, "unclean 
hands" is the factual basis for the legal conclusion that a given plaintiff is not entitled to 
equitable relief. 
9
 Alton refers to the Findings and Conclusions based on the labels given them 
by the trial court, recognizing that the Court of Appeals will analyze the Findings and 
Conclusions based on their substance, not their labels. Fernandez v. Cook, 217 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 870 P.2d 870, 874-75 (Utah 1993). 
Page 8 
i /. Fhe constructive trust is ilot and was not a permitted transferee under 
the Medicaid exceptions10. (R 152, FOF ^17). 
The relevant conclusion- ^ law stated: 
1. I he parties to this action are charged to know the actual law. h c i 
though plaintiff received its information from defendant, and though; 
advised it properly as to the law, plaintiff is specifically charged to know 
ihc law when it seeks to avail the estate of a benefit of a statutory exception 
nit: avoiding a lien. Tlic deed was prepared for that purpose. Plaintiffs 
may not characterize the property one way for the purpose of getting 
Medicaid benefits, and then offer a much different legal characterizatic* 
the conveyance to enforce a constructive trust. (R. 151, FOF ^1) 
o. i v ui uiough the Court agrees with plaintiffs analysis, with the 
exception of the Medicaid statutory exemption, inasmuch as plaintiff comes 
with unclean hands, the court is barred from providing equitable relief, 
including the reformation of a deed. The Court is barred from granting the 
relief prayed for n? i s n r n r « K ) . 
KV:i(
 • " : J . aticr oi tact, that the Plan 
violated Medicaid ILV.. ii then charged Alton with knowledge of that fact. Based on that 
constructive knowledge, the court then concluded that Altoii had unclean hands. 
There support (lnwn I luigs 
Lloyd testified that he never agreed to return the Trust's corpus after Alta's death. 
"I didn't agree to that because I couldn't. I couldn't agree to anything like that because 
that's i lot w 1 lat IV iedicaid told mi: lo do | I S < I 1 liar is no h".limoii\ In, 1 Itn, J ,i\ in 
w! iat I\ Iedicaid t :)1 :11 mt » i l1, l ' ;i tici ilai there was i 10 testimony from any witness that the 
10
 Contrary to the implication of this finding, a constructive trust is not an entity 
to which a transfer can be made. Rather, it is an equitable remedy used to prevent unjust 
enrichment. See Parks v. Zions First National Bank. 673 P.2d 590, 599-600 (I Jtah 1983). 
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Plan was improper or illegal. Moreover, the Court specifically rejected Lloyd's 
testimony. (R. 152-153, FOF ffi[ 11-12, 14). 
There is only one other part of the record that remotely supports the Court's 
holding. During the testimony of Alton, he was asked why the Trust property could not 
be transferred to anyone other than Lloyd. Without any foundation that Alton was 
qualified to explain the application of state and federal Medicaid laws, counsel for Lloyd 
sought to show that the family knew that the Plan was improper. (See T.59-64). Alton 
repeatedly testified that, based on what Lloyd had told him, it was his understanding that 
it was not illegal or improper for Lloyd to agree to transfer the Trust's property back to 
the Trust after Alta's death. Id.; (see also T.29-32). Indeed, Alton's testimony forms the 
factual foundation for the trial court's finding that Lloyd committed fraud. (R. 153, ]f 12). 
Outside of this testimony of Lloyd and Alton, Lloyd produced no evidence that the 
agreement to return the property was illegal or improper. Taken as a whole, the trial 
testimony supports a finding that the transaction was legal and proper. Only Lloyd met 
with the Medicaid officials. (R. 153, FOF ^ 9; T. 82). Alton testified that Lloyd told him 
that the Medicaid officials had approved the transaction. (T.29-32). That is the only 
substantive evidence in the record as to propriety or legality of the Plan, and that evidence 
supports only one finding: that the Plan was proper and legal. 
Toward the end of Alton's cross examination, he was asked if he intended to 
"trick" the government. (T.62). He responded: 
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A Absolutely not. There was no intention whatsoever. It was represented to me as I 
testified, that Medicaid, because Lloyd lived there, said that because of that they 
would not encumber the property and I felt it was an opportunity at that point for 
the trust to be able to be saved and we put it in Lloyd's name to do that with the 
understanding that he would, uh, honor that agreement and return it to the trust or 
it would be liquidated as mother and dad had wanted it done. 
(T.63). This testimony illustrates a fundamental deficiency in I loyd's "clean hands" 
argument There is no tesu;. . • • 
Line transfer to LIr\ c!] was illegal because it wouldn't have 
been, it would have been a legal transfer biit it was just that [Alta] wouldn't have hvu 
eligible for Medicaid." /nr ^ m There was nothing improper or ; • >egal about a transfer to 
never applied for Medicaid oi il ^hc -nplied for Medicaid and fully disclosed the Plan, 
there would be no impropriety. 
i .uui ,iMMM: V,.W not produce any evidence to establish ...ai UIL ; .in wa.s improper 
Alton iiad "unclean hands/* When the trial court found that "Plaintiffs may not 
characterize the property one way for the purpose of getting Medicaid benefits," it 
assun led facts tl lat w = it c: t IC >t in i. : ' i de i ice ' I I lei e t \ ' a s i IC » =: • ' ' ide i IC " tl lat \ lta \ ltoi i or 
anyone else made any representation to Medicaid, much less a misrepresentation. In 
essence, the trial court found "unclean hands" on the basis of Lloyd's arguments, without 
the foundational facts necessary to make those arguments. 
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Accordingly, the trial court's finding of fact that Alton had "unclean hands" is 
clearly erroneous. Without that finding, as the court itself held, a constructive trust 
should be imposed on Lloyd to prevent unjust enrichment. (R. 150, FOF ^2.) 
2. ALTON DID NOT HA VE UNCLEAN HANDS; ASSUMING HE 
VIOLA TED A LAW OR REGULA TION, HE DID SO NEITHER 
KNOWINGLY NOR WILFULLY. 
Assuming Alton's conduct violated a law or regulation, Alton only had unclean 
hands if he acted wilfully and knowingly. In explaining the doctrine of "unclean hands," 
the Utah Supreme Court, quoting a United States Supreme Court decision, stated: 
It is inherent in the nature and purpose of equity that it will grant relief only 
when fairness and good conscience so demand. Correlated to this is the 
precept that equity does not reward one who has engaged in fraud or deceit 
in the business under consideration, but reserves its rewards for those who 
are themselves acting in fairness and good conscience, or as is sometimes 
said, to those who have come into Court with clean hands. 
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1977) (citations omitted). The trial court 
expanded this holding to deprive an otherwise blameless plaintiff from relief because the 
plaintiff "reasonably relied" upon the "fraudulent misrepresentations" of the culpable 
defendant. (R. 152, FOF ^ 14; R. 153, FOF ^ 12). Not granting relief under these 
circumstances should offend every reasonable person's concept of "fairness and good 
conscience." 
The Federal Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly held that the clean hands 
doctrine will only be applied where there is "fraud or wilful misconduct." Eresch v. 
Braecklein, 133 F.2d 12, 14 (10th Cir. 1943). "It is well settled that it is only fraud or 
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willful misconduct w; . •. tiars one from, recovering in a C on n t ot eqi lit;; • i : • dei tl , • [< ; :h : •: , i 
h a n d s d o i l J i m | 1  IK IIIII.I SUM n h ir I i l lu i l n i'.» nil Iin m i . i i h n ill in nit n IN m / u h g e n t 
must ondiR I " Id (emphasis added). Based on tl ic trial court s findings of fact, i \llot i s 
misconduct was simply negligent. (See F. • " 1 r O F *' 'r 
Similar!}, iia t ut^'d States Supreme Court stated: 
I he governing principle [of the clean hands doctrinej is that whenever a 
party who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain 
some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other equitable 
principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the Coin t will be shut 
against him , . .. [Thus,] he who asks relief must have acted in good faith. 
Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.. 290 1 J.S 2 4C 2 1 1 \ 5 (1933) (ei nplu i s i s 
.'iil(li"il i i i . t l ioi i ' . ii'iiiiidi J l V\ Ii In dii" ti ial court's findings of fact do not expressly state 
that Alton acted in good faith, they strongly imply that conclusion. (See R. 15 1 FOF 1] 1; 
R 152, FOF f^ 14), See also Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance 
M a c h . C o . , M-\ I I ' I Hi i I I  i III"» 1 *> I I iHiiiH ill m i n i w In iv p ml1 i o i n l m I i ' i . i m l n l 
with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks rel ief); 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ.Co., 513 IJ.S. 352, 360 (1995) (denying relief based 
on the plaintiffs "reprehensible conduct iii tlic course o; UK u\i;;saen^: A is^ue 
^ ccoi (Ill lgh '" *[t]l I ;;:' ii iecji litable coi icii ict ^ '1 licl I cai ise s tl le [clean hands] doctrine to 
be invoked must be wilful, and usually iiivolves fraud, illegality, unfairness, or bad faith." 
William J. Lawrence, III, Note, THE APPLICATION < '• . . // LLAS i i 1 \ / 
D O d R I M I X I U M t d l U !U>\S "- ' N n l i . I M n u I .••. PlnnHv I f j i n r ( »i\\ .,i:r 
( lve an luund that Lloyd fraudulently deceived Alton and was unjustly 
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enriched. (R. 153, FOF 1 12; R. 151, FOF 1 22). Further, it held Alton "reasonably" 
relied on Lloyd's fraudulent misrepresentations. (R. 152, FOF If 14). Assuming Alton's 
conduct was improper, it was never wilful. Under proper application of the clean hands 
doctrine, Alton was not guilty of unclean hands; if guilty at all, he was guilty of trusting 
his deceitful brother. 
Because neither Alton nor any other principal family members engaged in conduct 
that suggests misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, or acts of bad faith, Alton does not meet the 
threshold required by both Federal and Utah State case law to be saddled with unclean 
hands. The conclusion of law so holding is clearly incorrect. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
BALANCED THE EQUITIES AND FOUND IN FAVOR OF LLOYD. 
Upon Alton's motion for a new trial, the trial court modified its earlier ruling that 
by finding Alton had unclean hands, it was absolutely barred from granting relief. (R. 
150, Tj 6). Consistent with a number of cases, the trial court held that a plaintiff with 
unclean hands could recover if, upon weighing the relative equities of the parties' 
position, the trial court determined that the proper and equitable result was to rule in favor 
of the plaintiff. See Janke v. Janke. 366 N.Y.S.2d 910, 47 A.D.2d 445, 450-451 
(N.Y.A.D. 1975); Bramlett v. Selman. 597 S.W.2d 80, 268 Ark. 457, 463 (Ark. 1980); 
Champion Map Corp. v. Chamco, Inc., 235 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla.App. 1970); Ramshardt v. 
Ballardinu 324 A.2d 69, 71, 129 NJ.Super. 445, 448 (N.J.Super.Ch. 1974). C.f. Jenkins 
v. Newman, 649 P.2d 15, 16 (Utah 1982) (although the defendant wrongfully refused to 
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perform the contract, the court concluded that it was "only fair and equitable to offset 
plaintiffs retention and use of about $ 30,000.") 
While the trial court acknowledged it should balance the equities between the 
parties, its ruling fails to provide any reasoned analysis of Alton's misconduct vis a vis 
Lloyd's. (R. 199-200). The trial court simply stated, "The Court has weighed all of the 
evidence and examined the conduct of both parties" and denied relief because "in 
balance, after weighing all the factors, [Alton is] not entitled to equitable relief." (R. 199, 
Tjl). Alton believes that the trial court eschewed a reasoned analysis in favor of these 
conclusory statements because any reasoned analysis would lead to a contrary decision. 
Balancing the Equities; Analyzing the parties' "Conduct" 
The relevant findings of the trial court can be summarized as follows: 
Alton's Conduct 
Alton should have known that the Plan 
proposed by Lloyd was improper or illegal 
because Alton is charged with a 
knowledge of the law. (R. 151, FOF H 1). 
Lloyd's Conduct 
Lloyd committed fraud by intentionally 
and continuously misleading Alton, Alta 
and the family, by stating that there was a 
Medicaid exception which allowed him 
receive the Homestead, then return the 
Homestead to the Trust without penalty, 
and by promising to return the Homestead 
to the Trust when he did not intend to do 
so. (R. 153, FOF m 9, 12). 
Page 15 
Alton stated one purpose for the transfer 
of the Homestead to the Trust to Medicaid 
and then asserted a different purpose for 
the transfer in the court action.11 (R. 151, 
FOF1J1). 
Mitigating factors 
Alton reasonably relied upon Lloyd's 
statements concerning the Plan and 
Medicaid's policies. (R. 152,FOFTJ 
14)._ 
There was no evidence that Medicaid was 
harmed. 
Lloyd breached his fiduciary duty as a 
trustee of the Trust when he proposed the 
Plan without having any intention of 
keeping the promise he made and then 
using his office as trustee to convey the 
Homestead to himself in furtherance of his 
fraud. (R. 150,FOFU5). | 
Lloyd was unjustly enriched, and Alton 
was damaged. R. 151, FOF Tj 22,1 23. | 
Mitigating factors 
None. In fact the Court stated it was 
'loath to endorse" Lloyd's conduct and 
the result it reached. (T. 122). 
While this Court should give great deference to the trial court's discretionary 
exercise of its equitable powers, it should nonetheless find an abuse in these 
circumstances. Alton's analysis is not based on a one-sided analysis of the facts favorable 
to his position. Rather, Alton simply relies on the actual findings of the trial court, 
including the one without evidentiary support, to establish that "the judgment has so 
failed to do equity that it manifests a clear abuse of discretion . . .," and Alton thus asks 
"this Court on review [to] take appropriate corrective action in Ihe interests of justice." 
Watson, 561 P.2d at 1074. Where the trial court itself held that the imposition of a 
As noted in Point I, this Conclusion of Law has no evidentiary support. 
However, for purposes of this analysis, Alton assumes it is accurate. 
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constructive trust and the reformation of the deed "would be an appropriate remedy," (R. 
150, FOF f^ 4) it is "inherently unfair" to sustain the trial court in these circumstances. 
State v. Arguelles. 63 P.3d 731, 465 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2003 UT 1 ^101 (Utah 2003). If 
one weighs the relative equities of Alton's position vis a vis Lloyd's, there is simply no 
reasoned basis not to grant Alton relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Lloyd actively solicited the transfer of the Homestead to himself. He made 
fraudulent misrepresentations and unjustly enriched himself. The trial court was "loath to 
endorse" Lloyd, his actions, and this unjust enrichment, but by failing to grant relief, that 
is exactly what it did. The trial court erred when it found misconduct by Alton based on 
an assumed fact without record evidence to support it, when it failed to recognize that 
unclean hands requires wilful misconduct and cannot be predicated on negligent 
misconduct, and when it failed to balance the equities between Alton and Lloyd. 
Accordingly, Alton asks this Court to reverse the trial court, to order the Court to impose 
a constructive trust on the Homestead, and to remand this case for further proceedings 
consistent with the Court's decision. 
Dated this b> day of January, 2004. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
ALBERT N. PRANNO 
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Frederick A. Jackman 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 110 
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Counsel for Defendant/Appellee 
& on this _ day of January, 2004. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, dated September 12, 2001 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
<\ wO\ W& Deputy 
THOMAS J. SCRIBNER, 4910 
DONALD E. McCANDLESS, 5313 
SCRIBNER, STIRLAND & McCANDLESS, P.C. 
2696 No. University Ave, Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801)375-5600 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
ALTON HONE, et. al., 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
LLOYD W. HONE, et al. 
Defendant 
CV970400463 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court for trial on August 5, 1999. The 
Plaintiffs, Alton Hone, et al. were present and represented by counsel, Thomas J. Scribner. The 
Defendants, Lloyd W. Hone, et al., were present and represented by counsel, Frederick A. 
Jackman. The Court having reviewed the pleadings filed herein, having heard testimony and 
good cause appearing therefore, now makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties to this action are residents of Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. Jurisdiction is proper in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State 
of Utah. 
3. The property that is the subject of dispute in this matter was held in the Rulon J. 
Hone Inter Vivos Revocable Trust. Plaintiff is a trustee of that trust. 
4. At the death of Rulon J. Hone the subject property flowed to the marital trust in 
the trust vehicle. Said trust gave broad powers to the trustees. 
5. Alta Hone was the primary beneficiary of the marital trust and therefore had the 
power, along with the trustees, to transfer the subject property to whomever she 
chose. Plaintiff Alta Hone and defendant were in a confidential relationship with 
respect to the transfer of the subject real property. 
6. The trust included broad powers to the Trustees, including action which might, 
under other circumstances, be viewed as self-dealings, or acts of self-dealing. 
7. Alta Hone became ill and her illness and the possible necessity of institutional 
care became the subject of discussion. 
8. The parties recognized that Medicaid could assist them with Alta's care, but 
would subject her estate to a Medicaid lien or, prospectively, a statutory right of 
reimbursement. 
Defendant Lloyd Hone inquired on the subject with agents of Medicaid and 
advised the Plaintiff Trustee and other members of the family of his 
understanding of Medicaid's statements regarding an exemption to the Medicaid 
lien requirements and permitted transferees. 
Other family members expected that he would hold the property in trust for the 
benefit of family members. 
It was the intent of the Petitioner and other family members that the deed, signed 
on February 28, 1994, would transfer the property from the Trust and be held by 
the Defendant until the death of Alta, and then returned to the Plaintiffs trust for 
the benefit of family members. The deed was made, prepared and executed for 
the purpose to serve as an instrument to the parties to avoid a Medicaid lien. 
Lloyd Hone participated in those discussions and agreed to the above proposition 
prior to the execution of the deed. He also reaffirmed the proposition after the 
execution of the deed. He made these representations fraudulently, knowing that 
the other familv members would believe them, and for the purpose of inducing 
plaintiff and Alta Hone to deed the property to him. 
The parties agreement constituted a constructive trust; as the conveyance was one 
with strings. 
14. The family members reasonably relied upon the Defendant's characterization of 
the statutory exception for the transfer and they acted upon his representations and 
to conveyed the property to the Defendant to meet what they understood to be the 
exception regarding the Medicaid or the Government's rule. Plaintiff and Alta 
Hone believed their actions would benefit the beneficiaries of the plaintiff trust. 
15. The family members expected Mr. Lloyd Hone to hold the property as a Trustee 
and that he would thereafter re-convey it to them and as such he would serve as a 
Trustee for the interests of family members and contingent beneficiaries of the 
constructive trust. 
16. After the death of Alta Hone, Lloyd Hone refused to transfer the property to the 
trust, placing him in breach of the constructive trust. 
17. The constructive trust is not and was not a permitted transferee under the 
Medicaid exceptions. 
18. The Conveyance was made at the suggestion of Lloyd Hone since he indicated 
that he had conferred with Medicaid officers. 
19. The conveyance was not barred by the Trust or the trust language. 
20. The Plaintiff seeks, in equity, to enforce the constructive trust for the benefit of 
the contingent family beneficiaries and to reform the deed and also charges the 
Defendant with fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. 
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21. The principle brothers in the Plaintiffs trust relied on the statements of the 
Defendant respecting what constituted the lawT and what Medicaid would do, and 
what the controlling language was in the Medicaid statute regarding permitted 
transferees. They also relied on the representations of defendant that he would 
hold the subject real property for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the plaintiff 
trust. 
22. Defendant Lloyd Hone was unjustly enriched by the conveyance. 
23. Plaintiff trust and the other beneficiaries have been damaged by the fraudulent 
representations of the defendant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties to this action are charged to know the actual law. Even though 
plaintiff received its information from defendant, and thought he advised it 
properly as to the law, plaintiff is specifically charged to know the law when it 
seeks to avail the estate of a benefit of a statutory exception and avoiding a lien. 
The deed was prepared for that purpose. Plaintiffs may not characterize the 
property one way for the purpose of getting Medicaid benefits, and then offer a 
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much different legal characterization of the conveyance to enforce a constructive 
trust. 
2. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs satisfied the burden and elements for 
constructive trust and that a constructive trust did exist, with defendant acting as 
trustee of that trust. 
3. Plaintiff, being charged with knowledge of the law, therefore comes before the 
court seeking an equitable reformation of the deed with unclean hands. Further, 
the constructive trust was not and is not a permitted transferee under the law. 
4. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs satisfied the elements of fraud, and that 
defendant committed fraud against plaintiffs in his actions and refusal to deed the 
property back into the plaintiffs trust, causing damage to the beneficiaries of the 
trust. Further, the Court concludes that reformation of the deed to place 
ownership back in the plaintiff trust would be an appropriate remedy. 
5. The court concludes as a matter of law that defendant breached his fiduciary duty 
as trustee of the plaintiffs trust by transferring the subject real property to 
himself, and refusing to transfer it back to the trust, causing damage to the 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
6. Even though the Court agrees with plaintiffs analysis, with the exception of the 
medicaid statutory exemption, inasmuch as plaintiff comes with unclean hands, 
6 
the Court is barred from providing equitable relief, including the reformation of a 
deed. The Court is barred from granting the relief prayed for. 
DATED this \3V- day of August, 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
.^V-lFWAfe 
FRED D. HOWARD 
/District Court Judge '.'vZ .4:/ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on 
this<S^> day of August, 2001, to the following: 
Frederick A. Jackman 
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Orem, Utah 84097 
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ORDER (Re: trial August 5,1999), dated September 12, 2001 
THOMAS J. SCRIBNER, 4910 
DONALD E. McCANDLESS, 5313 
SCRIBNER, STIRLAND & McCANDLESS, P.C 
2696 No. University Ave, Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801)375-5600 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ALTON HONE, et. al., : ORDER 
Plaintiff : 
vs. : 
LLOYD W. HONE, et al., : CV 970400463 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Defendant : 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court for trial on August 5, 1999. The 
Plaintiffs, Alton Hone, et al. were present and represented by counsel Thomas J. Scribner. The 
Defendants, Lloyd W. Hone, et al., were present and represented by counsel, Frederick A. 
Jackman. The Court having reviewed the pleadings filed herein, having heard testimony and 
good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law-
attached hereto and incorporated herein by references, all causes of action prosecuted by 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
Plaintiff at trial are denied. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED thi day of November. 129^<-Jo/. 
BY THE COURT: 
f^ EDD. HOWARD "Z^^^^S 
District Court Judge '-V-«,."~"' '"'"". ^",v 
j * 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage pre-paid, was 
mailed to the following this JL_ day of November, 1999. 
Frederick A. Jackman 
1327 South 800 East 
Orem, UT 84097 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, 
dated April 8, 2003 
hourth^diciaJ District Court 







IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALTON HONE et al, 
vs. 
LLOYD W. HONE et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case # 970400463 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 2 
Coming before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial. The Court having considered 
Plaintiffs' Motion and Defendants' opposition to the Motion; and having heard oral argument on the 
Motion, and having entered its Ruling of March 7, 2002; the Court hereby denies the Motion. 
Contemporaneously with the submission of Plaintiffs' proposed Order Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for New Trial, Defendants submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The Court notes, however, that it has heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on September 12,2001. Therefore, the Court sees no basis for the recent submission and respectfully 
declines to sign and enter such Findings and Conclusions. 
Dated this & day of April 2003. 
JJJDGE FRED D. HOWARD *T 
Mstrict Court Judge v .. '" 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Order were mailed, postage prepaid, on the 
Z> day of April 2003 to the following at the addresses indicated, to wit: 
Thomas J. Scribner 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Frederick A. Jackman 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 110 
Orem, UT 84097 
Deputy Court Clerk 
